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Abstract
I’ll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The
rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional
probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn
out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I’ll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds
lower than 1, and compare them to these two standard systems.
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1. Introduction
I will describe a range of nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold.
More precisely, let r be a fixed real number greater than 1/2, and let P be any conditional probability function defined
on a language for predicate logic with identity. Consider the conditional |∼ defined as follows: B |∼A holds just in case
P [A | B] r . Let’s call |∼, as just defined, the r-level consequence relation associated with conditional probability
function P . More generally, the r-level consequence relations are just those associated with at least one conditional
probability function P at threshold level r . I will characterize r-level consequence relations for various values of r in
terms of logical rules—rules like, “if (B ·C) |∼A and (B ·¬C) |∼A, then B |∼A”, which are only about the conditional
expressions, and say nothing of probabilities. It turns out that the logical rules that these conditionals satisfy are mostly
weaker versions of the logical rules for the two best-known logics of nonmonotonic conditionals—i.e., the logics of
the preferential consequence relations, P, and of the rational consequence relations, which I’ll call R.1
The conditionals I’ll be investigating are of the kind that nonmonotonic logicians call ‘consequence relations’
by analogy to the logical consequence relation. They are metalinguistic relations between sentences. Conditional
probability functions applied to sentences are also usually taken to be metalinguistic—i.e. they are not generally taken
to be part of the object language. So, the corresponding conditionals, |∼, are also metalinguistic. Thus, I will call all
of the conditionals under investigation here ‘consequence relations’.
E-mail address: hawthorne@ou.edu.
1 See [4] for a thorough treatment of P, and [7] for the scoop on R. The best known semantics for these conditionals is in terms of preferential
models, which is fully explicated in these two papers, and also in [9].1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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626 J. Hawthorne / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 625–637This paper is aimed at two audiences. It’s pitched at probabilistic logicians, who may find it of interest for the
way it articulates the qualitative structure of conditional-probability-above-a-threshold. In that regard this logic is
somewhat like the logic of Qualitative Probability (a.k.a. Comparative Probability). But whereas the basic concept
in that logic is the ‘A is-no-more-probable-than B’ relation, A  B , the basic concept we’ll be looking at here is
the ‘given B , it-is-very-probable-that A’ relation B |∼ A. More accurately, we will investigate a whole array of such
consequence relations ranging from ‘it-is-more-probable-than-not-that’ (corresponding to a threshold just over 1/2),
through consequence relations for various higher threshold levels, up to ‘it-is-almost-certain-that’ (corresponding to
a threshold of 1). Each quantitative probability function embodies all of these qualitative notions at once. Perhaps
something can be learned from disentangling them.
The other audience I’m pitching consists of logicians interested the nonmonotonic conditionals known as conse-
quence relations. The systems under study have a common core, a system I’ll call O, whose rules are weaker analogues
of the rules for the well-known system P of Preferential Consequence Relations. Various ways of supplementing the
rules of O give rise to various systems of consequence relations, including the system P itself and the system for the
Rational Consequence Relations, R. What ties these systems together is the way in which they are embodied by (i.e.
modeled in) the conditional probability functions. Indeed, every conditional probability function embodies a complete
array of nonmonotonic consequence relations drawn from the systems we’ll be looking at.
Here is a brief outline of how I’ll proceed. First I’ll specify the logic of conditional probabilities that will serve as
a standard against which we’ll gauge the nonmonotonic conditional logics. Next I’ll set down rules for a system of
consequence relations that I call O. Each rule for consequence relations in O is r-level sound for each r > 0. That is,
choose any specific threshold r > 0: then by replacing each conditional expression of form B |∼A in the rules of O by
a conditional probability sentence P [A | B] r , each rule turns out to hold for every probability function P . If we add
an additional simple rule to O, the rule known as AND, we get the preferential consequence relations P—even though
three of the rules of O are much weaker than their usual counterparts associated with P. Add to the rules of P the rule
known as Rational Monotony (RM) and we get the rational consequence relations R. Interestingly, it turns out that the
consequence relations of system R are just the class of threshold-level-1 probabilistic consequence relations. That is,
for each relation |∼ that satisfies the rules of R there is a conditional probability function P such that B |∼ A holds
just in case P [A | B] = 1; and the probability 1 part of each conditional probability function is just a consequence
relation |∼ that satisfies the rules of R.
The fact that the 1-level consequence relations are so tightly connected with the well-known rational consequence
relations suggests that it may be illuminating to take a look at r-level consequence relations for values of r less
than 1. We will see what additional rules, added to O, are probabilistically sound for various levels of the threshold
r below 1. Although neither AND nor Rational Monotony (RM), nor the rule known as Cautious Monotony (CM) are
probabilistically sound for thresholds r below 1, the weaker monotonicity rule called Negation Rationality (NR) does
turn out to be probabilistically sound for each possible threshold level r > 0. The system for consequence relations
gotten by supplementing O with Negation Rationality constitutes the system I’ll call Q.
None of the rules of Q itself are specific to a given threshold level r > 0. That is, each rule of Q applies to all
r-level consequence relations, for any given value of r . However, there are two additional rules that are closely tied
to specific threshold levels. One applies whenever the threshold r is greater than some rational number (n− 1)/n, for
fixed n  2. The other applies whenever the threshold r is no greater than the rational number n/(n + 1), for fixed
n 2. I call the system of consequence relations that satisfy both of these rules, for a specific value of n, Q(n). They
behave like conditional probabilities above some threshold r such that (n−1)/n < r  n/(n+1). These level-specific
rules turn out to have a close connection to the Preface and the Lottery Paradoxes.
2. The logic of conditional probabilities
When applied to propositions or sentences, probability is usually specified as a one-place function, and conditional
probability is then defined in terms of this function: P [A | B] = P [A · B]/P [B] for P [B] > 0, and P [A | B] is unde-
fined for P [B] = 0. However, there is a very natural way of axiomatizing probability that takes conditional probability
as primitive. It turns out that this treatment of conditional probability is closely related to logics of nonmonotonic con-
ditionals.
Think of conditional probabilities as extending logical entailment to a conception of probabilistic truth-
transmission from premise to conclusion. There are many such extensions—many such probability functions. For,
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Formally, the degree to which premise B probabilistically entails conclusion A relative to an interpretation α of a lan-
guage L is represented by a function on pairs of sentences, Pα[A | B]. We may think of each conditional probability
function Pα as associated with some way of assigning meanings to the terms of the language, and as supplementing
that with a measure on possible worlds. Thus, ‘Pα[A | B] = r’ may be taken to say that among the worlds in which
sentence B is true, A is true in proportion r of them (according to some measure on worlds associated with Pα).
Alternatively, we may think of ‘α’ as representing a possible agent, and think of each possible agent as having
(either implicitly or explicitly) some degree-of-belief function that expresses how strongly premise sentences support
conclusion sentences. For an agent α, let Pα represent her conditional degree-of-belief function, given the meaning of
the sentences of her language.
Whatever way one conceptualizes the conditional probability functions, the axioms for these functions specify
constraints that they must respect given the meanings of logical terms (NOT, AND, OR, etc.). Here is a fairly standard
set of axioms:
Definition 1 (CP). Let L be a language for predicate logic with identity. Let ‘’ be the standard logical entailment
relation. A conditional probability function (CP function) on L is any function P from pairs of sentences to real
numbers between 0 and 1 that satisfies the following rules.
0. There are sentences D and E such that, P [D | E] < 1; for all sentences A, B , C:
1. If B A, then P [A | B] = 1;
2. If  (B ≡ C), then P [A | B] = P [A | C];
3. If C ¬(B · A), then either P [(A ∨ B) | C] = P [A | C] + P [B | C] or P [D | C] = 1 for every sentence D;
4. P [(A · B) | C] = P [A | (B · C)] · P [B | C].
Holding any sentence C fixed, each function P [. . . | C] behaves just like a classical unconditional probability
function as usually defined on sentences of a formal language. Furthermore, whenever P [Y | C] > 0, P [X | Y · C] =
P [X ·Y | C]/P [Y | C], in agreement with the classical definition of conditional probability. However, the CP functions
extend classical probability in that they remain defined even when probabilities are conditionalized on sentences
having probability 0—i.e. P [A | (B · C)] remains defined even when P [B | C] = 0.2
Perhaps a comment on the formal language I’m using is in order here before proceeding. All of the logical systems
I’ll describe in this paper are defined on a standard formal language L for predicate logic with identity. Nothing I’ll
say really hangs on this. The language could just as well have been weaker—say, that of sentential logic. But then the
reader might have been left wondering whether the results only hold for the weaker language.3
3. Systems O and P
There are two complimentary ways of describing a logic for nonmonotonic consequence relations. Sometimes
logicians identify such a logic in terms of its inference rules. The issue then is, “what are reasonable rules for a
nonmonotonic consequence relation to follow, and what inferences can we make from some conditional claims to
others based on these rules”. Other times we think of such a logic as a class of possible consequence relations, all
2 The CP functions are basically just the Popper–Field functions; however the usual axiomatization for the Popper–Field functions is more elegant
in that it does not employ (or in any way presuppose) the deductive notion of logical truth or logical consequence. See [2] and [3] for details.
3 It is also common to define probability on propositions instead of on sentences of a formal language, where a proposition is taken to be a set
of possible worlds. In that case one would have to broach the issue of whether the probability functions are countably additive or only finitely
additive. That issue doesn’t arise here because the object language L doesn’t have an expression for infinite disjunction (which would correspond
to countable unions). It does, however, have existential quantifiers, which behave somewhat like infinite disjunctions. Indeed, one could add a weak
kind of countable additivity axiom to the axioms of CP, as follows: for each open formula Fx, P [ ∃xFx | B] = limn P [Fc1 ∨· · ·∨Fcn | B], where
the individual constants c1, . . . , cn, . . . , exhaust the countably infinite list of L’s individual constants. However, in the context of predicate logic
this axiom seems overly strong, since it effectively assumes that every individual gets named. If we don’t assume that all individuals are named,
the strongest claim we should want is that P [ ∃xFx | B]  limn P [Fc1 ∨ · · · ∨ Fcn | B]. However, this already follows from the axioms of CP,
because B · (Fc1 ∨· · ·∨Fcn)  ∃xFx, so P [ ∃xFx | B · (Fc1 ∨· · ·∨Fcn)] = 1, so P [ ∃xFx | B] P [(Fc1 ∨· · ·∨Fcn) | B · ∃xFx] ·P [ ∃xFx |
B] = P [(Fc1 ∨ · · · ∨ Fcn) · ∃xFx | B] = P [ ∃xFx | B · (Fc1 ∨ · · · ∨ Fcn)] · P [(Fc1 ∨ · · · ∨ Fcn) | B] = P [(Fc1 ∨ · · · ∨ Fcn) | B].
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logic the former mode is most usually associated with the “syntactic” proof theory of the logic, and the later mode is
associated with the semantics. But labeling these two modes as “syntactic” and “semantic” is not very helpful in the
logics we will be looking at. Rather, in these logics it may be best to think of the consequence relations themselves as
semantic, as part of the metalanguage, just as probability functions are semantic—i.e., they are not part of the object
language. That’s how presentations of the well-known nonmonotonic logics P and R often treat consequence relations
(e.g. see [4,7]).
To see the point, think about the logic of conditional probability—the system CP just described. The axioms of CP
can be used to derive some conditional probability claims from others—a very useful thing when we have only partial
information about a probability function (or about a class of such functions). On the other hand, we also associate
with CP the class of all conditional probability functions—all functions on pairs of sentences that satisfy the axioms.
When we think of the logic this way, the axioms play the role of constrains that must be satisfied if a function is to
be considered a CP-function. Thus the “logic of CP” both tells us which functions are “in CP” in terms of rules that
specify constraints on all such functions, and it gives us rules for deriving some probability statements from others,
where the soundness of such derivations depend on the fact that all CP-functions are defined in terms of those very
rules.
Both of these ways of looking at CP is “semantic” in the sense that the probability functions in CP are semantic
functions—not part of the object language. The object language on which they are defined is generally a formal lan-
guage for sentential or predicate logic. The probability functions play the role of metalinguistic, semantic predicates,
in much the way that truth-under-interpretation is metalinguistic and semantic. So the “derivation rules” are really
semantic rules that specify precisely what semantic claims (involving probabilities) can be derived from others—
much as the semantic rules governing truth-value assignments can be used to derive claims about what truth-values of
sentences follow from the truth-values of other sentences.
Each of the systems for nonmonotonic consequence relations I’ll discuss has this same dual aspect. For example,
I am about to specify “the logic” of the system I’ll call O. (Think of O, represented by the letter ‘O’, as system-zero,
the weakest system I’ll talk about.) I will specify O in terms of certain semantic rules that any consequence relation
must satisfy to be an O-relation.
Consider the set of all ordered pairs of sentences from a given language. Take any subset of it—let’s call it ‘α’. Any
such α is a rudimentary consequence relation. We usually write these ordered pairs like this: ‘B |∼A’, rather than like
this: ‘〈B,A〉’. So when the pair 〈B,A〉 is in α, we say instead that the conditional expression ‘B |∼ A’ is in α. (One
might here employ the subscripting convention we used with probability functions: just as there are various possible
probability functions Pα , there are various possible consequence relations |∼α .)
Many such consequence relations will be of no interest at all. They violate even the most obvious constraints on
how a consequence relation should behave. The system O specifies some very weak semantic rules that we’ll suppose
any set of pairs of sentences should satisfy if it is to reasonably count as a consequence relation. The consequence
relations in O are just those that satisfy the following semantic constraints.
Definition 2 (O). Let L be a language for predicate logic with identity. Let ‘’ be the standard logical entailment
relation. An O consequence relation on L is any set of pairs of sentences that satisfies the following rules:
0. There are sentences D and E such that it’s not the case that E |∼ D (Non-Triviality)
1. A |∼ A (REFLEX: Reflexivity)
2. if C |∼ B and B A, then C |∼ A (RW: Right Weakening)
3. if B  C and C  B and B |∼ A, then C |∼ A (LLE: Left Logical Equivalence)
4. if (C · B) |∼ A and (C · ¬B) |∼ A, then C |∼ A (WOR: Weak Or)
5. if C |∼ (B · A), then (C · B) |∼ A (VCM: Very Cautious Monotony)
6. (C · ¬B) |∼ B , C |∼ A then C |∼ (B · A) (WAND: Weak And)
Some of the rules of O should be familiar. The non-triviality condition is not usually given. Clearly it is only
violated by that one monstrous consequence relation that holds between all pairs of sentence. Reflexivity, Right Weak-
ening, and Left Logical Equivalence are plausible conditions, satisfied by all well-known families of consequence
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tions. We’ll look at them in more detail in a moment.
Notice that each of the rules 0–6 is probabilistically sound at level r , for any level r you might choose. That is,
fix a threshold value r . Now replace each expression of form X |∼ Y in these rules with the corresponding expression
P [Y | X] r . Then each such rule is a theorem of probability theory—i.e., each follows from the rules of CP. This is
obvious for rules 0–3. Rule 4 (WOR) becomes the following theorem of CP:
if P
[
A | (C · B)] r and P [A | (C · ¬B)] r, then P [A | C] r.4
The soundness of rule 5 (VCM) is obvious, since the following is a theorem of CP:
if P
[
(B · A) | C] r, then P [A | (C · B)] r.5
Rule 6 (WAND) is also sound, since:
if P
[¬B | (C · B)] r and P [A | C] r, then P [(A · B) | C] r.6
Thus we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Probabilistic soundness of O). Choose any threshold level r > 0. The rules of O are probabilistically
sound at level r .
However O is not probabilistically complete There are consequence relations satisfying all of these rules that
cannot be represented by any conditional probability function and threshold. This follows from the fact that there are
additional probabilistically sound rules not derivable from the rules of O. We will see some of these additional rules
presently.
How do the rules of O compare with those of the well-known preferential consequence relations, characterized by
the set of rules P? P has rules 1–3 (REFLEX, RW, and LLE). But P contains stronger versions of each of the rule 4–6.
Here is a typical definition of P:
Definition 3 (P). Let L be a language for predicate logic with identity. Let ‘’ be the standard logical entailment
relation. A P consequence relation on L is any set of pairs of sentences that satisfies the following rules:
0. There are sentences D and E such that it isn’t the case that E |∼ D (Non-Triviality)
1. A |∼ A (REFLEX: Reflexivity)
2. if C |∼ B and B A, then C |∼ A (RW: Right Weakening)
3. if B  C and C  B and B |∼ A, then C |∼ A (LLE: Left Logical Equivalence)
4P. if B |∼ A and C |∼ A, then (B ∨ C) |∼ A (OR)
5P. if C |∼ B and C |∼ A, then (C · B) |∼ A (CM: Cautious Monotonicity)
6P. if C |∼ B and C |∼ A, then C |∼ (B · A) (AND)
Rule 0 is usually left out of P. It merely eliminates the consequence relation for which each sentence is a conse-
quence of every sentence. Now let’s compare the rules of O to the corresponding rules of P.
Rules 0–3 are the same. So consider rule 4P (OR). This rule is probabilistically sound only when the threshold level
r = 1. 7 OR cannot be derived from WOR plus the other O rules, because whereas the O rules are probabilistically
4 Because CP is a slightly non-standard axiomatization of probability, and the reader may not be familiar with it, I’ll be very careful here. First
observe that for CP, whenever Z  (X ≡ Y ),P [X | Z] = P [Y | Z]. (That’s easy to show: suppose Z  (X ≡ Y ); then Z  ¬(X · ¬Y ) and Z 
(X∨¬Y ); so either P [D | Z] = 1 for all D (and we’re done), or by rule 3, 1 = P [X∨¬Y | Z] = P [X | Z]+P [¬Y | Z] = P [X | Z]+1−P [Y | Z];
done.) Now suppose P [A | (C ·B)] r and P [A | (C · ¬B)] r . Then either P [A | C] = 1 r (done), or (from rules 3, 4, and the previous result)
1 > P [A | C] = P [(A · B) ∨ (A · ¬B) | C] = P [A · B | C] + P [A · ¬B | C] = P [A | B · C] · P [B | C] + P [A | ¬B · C] · P [¬B | C] r .
5 Suppose P [B · A | C] r . Then r  P [A · B | C] = P [A | C · B] · P [B | C] P [A | C · B].
6 Suppose for r > 0, P [A | C] r and P [B | C ·¬B] r . If P [B ·A | C] = 1, we’re done; so suppose P [B ·A | C] < 1. Since P [¬B | ¬B ·C] = 1
(rule 1), we have P [B | ¬B · C] + P [¬B | ¬B · C] r + 1 > 1, so P [B | ¬B · C] = 1 (rule 3), so 1 = P [¬(B · ¬B) | C] = 1 − P [B · ¬B | C] =
1 − P [B | ¬B · C] · P [¬B | C] = 1 − P [¬B | C] = P [B | C] (rules 1, 3, 4, 3). Then, r  P [A | C] = P [(A · B) ∨ (A · ¬B) | C] = P [A · B |
C] + P [A · ¬B | C] = P [A | B · C] · P [B | C] + P [A | ¬B · C] · P [¬B | C] = P [A | B · C].
7 See Appendix A.
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rule, which makes the relationship between OR and WOR transparent:
4*. if ¬(B · C) and B |∼ A and C |∼ A, then (B ∨ C) |∼ A (XOR: exclusive or).8
This makes it clear that WOR is derivable from OR (together with the other O rules), and that OR is a strengthening of
WOR.
Rule 5P (CM), is also probabilistically sound only when the threshold level r = 1.9 Clearly rule 5 (VCM) can be
derived from CM (and the other O rules). But since CM is sound only for r = 1, it cannot be derive from VCM together
with the other O rules. The way in which CM is a strengthening of VCM is obvious.
AND, which is the P counterpart of O rule 6 (WAND) is also probabilistically sound only when the threshold level
r = 1.10 Furthermore, WAND can be derived from AND plus the other O rules; but since AND is sound only for r = 1,
it cannot be derive from WAND plus the other O rules.
The relationship between WAND and AND may not seem quite obvious. To see it more clearly, notice that the
condition ‘(C · ¬B) |∼ B’ in the antecedent of WAND is a strengthening of the condition ‘C |∼ B’ in AND.11 It
expresses the idea that “C makes B certain”—i.e., C supports B so strongly that adding any other sentence D to
C cannot undermine its support for B . (We’ll establish this in a moment.) AND strengthens WAND by weakening its
antecedent condition ‘(C · ¬B) |∼ B’ to the condition ‘C |∼ B’.
To see more clearly what an expression of form ‘(C · ¬B) |∼ B’ means in the context of O, consider the following
theorem:
Theorem 2 (Some theorems of O). Let |∼ be any consequence relation in O.
(1) The following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) (C · ¬B) |∼ B;
(ii) for all E, (C · ¬B) |∼ E;
(iii) for all D, (C · D) |∼ B .
(2) If (C · ¬B) |∼ B , then, for all A, C |∼ A if and only if (C · B) |∼ A.
Proof. Clause 1: Clearly, (ii) implies (i), and (iii) implies (i). To see that (i) implies (ii): suppose (i); then (C · ¬B) ·
¬B |∼ B (LLE) and C · ¬B |∼ ¬B (REFLEX, RW); so C · ¬B |∼ B · ¬B (WAND); so C · ¬B |∼ E for any E (RW). To
see that (i) implies (iii): suppose (i); then for all E, C · ¬B |∼ E (just proved); so for any D, C · ¬B |∼ (D · B); then
for any D, (C · D) · ¬B |∼ B (VCM, then LLE) and (C · D) · B |∼ B (by REFLEX, RW); thus, for any D, C · D |∼ B
(WOR).
Clause 2 of the theorem follows in one direction directly from rules WAND and VCM, and in the other direction
from clause 1(ii) and WOR.
Thus, when ‘(C · ¬B) |∼ B’ holds, ‘(C · ¬B)’ acts like a contradiction—i.e., ‘(C · ¬B)’ implies everything, and
‘C’ itself monotonically implies ‘B’.
Thus, O is weaker than P precisely in that its versions of rules 4–6 (WOR, VCM, WAND) are weaker versions of
the corresponding P rules (OR, CM, AND), versions that are satisfied at each threshold r > 0 by every conditional
probability function.
One might wonder whether we need to strengthen each of the weaker O rules in order to get the system P? The
answer turns out to be, no! It’s not hard to show that 4P (OR) and 5P (VCM) are derivable from the weaker rules (1–5)
together 6P (AND). Thus, the Preferential Consequence Relations are just those consequence relations in O that also
satisfy AND.
8 Suppose WOR, and suppose ¬(B ·C) and B |∼A and C |∼A. Then (by LLE) (B ∨C) · ¬C |∼A and (B ∨C) ·C |∼A, so B ∨C |∼A (WOR).
Conversely, suppose XOR, and suppose C · B |∼ A and C · ¬B |∼ A. Then (C · B) ∨ (C · ¬B) |∼ A (XOR), so C |∼ A (LLE).
9 See Appendix A.
10 See Appendix A.
11 In O, C · ¬B |∼ B implies C |∼ B: for, C · B |∼ B (REFLEX, RW), so by WOR C |∼ B .
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4–6 (WOR, VCM, WAND). Given rules 1–3, rules 4 and 5 (WOR, VCM) together with 6P (AND) imply rules 4P (OR)
and 5P (CM). Thus, |∼ is a relation in O that satisfies 6P (AND) if and only if |∼ is a consequence relation in P.
Proof. Given 1–3, getting 4–6 from 4P–6P is easy. So lets go the other way. Suppose 1–5 and 6P.
Here is how to get 4P (OR): Suppose B |∼ A and C |∼ A. Then (B ∨ C) · B |∼ A (LLE), so (B ∨ C) · B |∼ A ∨ ¬B
(RW); and (B ∨ C) · ¬B |∼ A ∨ ¬B (REFLEX, RW); thus B ∨ C |∼ A ∨ ¬B (WOR). Fairly similarly, (B ∨ C) · C |∼ A
(LLE), so (B ∨C) ·C |∼A∨B (RW); also (B ∨C) · ¬C |∼A∨B (REFLEX, RW); thus B ∨C |∼A∨B (WOR). From
the “thus” parts of the previous two sentences, B ∨ C |∼ (A ∨ B) · (A ∨ ¬B) (AND); so B ∨ C |∼ A (RW).
5P (CM) is easy: Suppose C |∼ B and C |∼ A. Then C |∼ B · A (AND), so C · B |∼ A (VCM).
4. Systems Q and R
The well-known Rational Consequence Relations are usually obtained by adding the following rule to those in P:
Definition 4 (R). An R consequence relation on L is any P consequence relation that satisfies the following rule:
7R. if C |∼ A, then C |∼ ¬B or (C · B) |∼ A (RM: Rational Monotony).
Like 4P–6P (OR, CM, AND), rule RM is probabilistically sound only for threshold level r = 1.12
The Rational Consequence Relations, R, are usually obtained by adding RM to the P rules. But in light of the
previous result the usual rules of R are equivalent to the weaker rules 1–5 for O together with 6P (AND) and 7R
(RM). In other words, the Rational Consequence Relations are just those consequence relations in O that satisfy AND
together with RM.
It turns out that the rules in O ∪ (AND, RM) are not only probabilistically sound at threshold level 1. They are also
probabilistically complete at level 1. That is, for each Rational Consequence Relation |∼ in R, there is a corresponding
conditional probability function P in CP such that ‘B |∼ A’ holds just in case P [A | B] = 1. In effect, the Rational
Consequence Relations are just the probability 1 parts of Conditional Probability Functions. Or, to put it another way,
given any Rational Consequence Relation |∼, it can always be extended to a conditional probability function P by
assigning P [A | B] = 1 when ‘B |∼ A’ holds and by assigning some appropriate non-negative number below 1 to
P [C | D] whenever ‘D |∼ C’ fails to hold. Let’s state all of this formally.
Theorem 4 (Probabilistic soundness and completeness of R). For each CP function P , if |∼ is the level-1 consequence
relation corresponding to P (i.e. if |∼ is defined by ‘B |∼ A’ holds just in case P [A | B] = 1), then |∼ is in R.
Furthermore, for each consequence relation |∼ in R, there is a probability function P in CP such that P [A | B] = 1
just in case B |∼ A is in R.
Proof. Soundness is easy. Completeness takes hard work (see [1,3,10]).
The system I call Q is the weaker analog of R, much as O is the weaker analog of P. Here is the definition of Q:
Definition 5 (Q). A Q consequence relation on L is any O consequence relation that satisfies the following rule:
7. if C |∼ A then (C · B) |∼ A or (C · ¬B) |∼ A (NR: Negation Rationality).
It is easy to check that NR is probabilistically sound for each threshold level.13 Thus, all of the Q rules are prob-
abilistically sound at every threshold level. NR (rule 7) is clearly a weaker analog of RM (rule 7R), and is derivable
12 See Appendix A.
13 Suppose P [A | C] r . Then either for every D, P [D | C] = 1, so 1 = P [A ·B | C] = P [A | C ·B] ·P [B | C], so P [A | C ·B] = 1 r , or else
r  P [A | C] = P [(A · B) ∨ (A · ¬B) | C] = P [A | C · B] · P [B | C] + P [A | C · ¬B] · P [¬B | C], which cannot be if both r > P [A | C · B] and
r > P [A | C · ¬B].
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(which is derivable in P):
8. if B |∼ A and B |∼ ¬A, then B |∼ D for every sentence D (XM: excluded middle).14
Notice that XM is itself probabilistically sound for each threshold level greater than 1/2.15 This rule is implied by one
of a spectrum of rules that correspond to lower bounds on threshold levels. We’ll now investigate systems that build
on Q by drawing on such threshold-specific rules.
5. The Q(n) systems
The rules of Q place no constraints on the value of the threshold level r > 0 required for conditional probability
functions to satisfy them. That is, choose any probability function P from CP and any threshold level r you want. You
may even choose r to be much smaller than 1/2—even extremely close to 0. The consequence relation corresponding
to P [ | ] r will, nevertheless, satisfy all of the Q rules. We now supplement Q with rules that characterize various
levels of probabilistic support above 1/2. For each integer n 2 we specify a distinct “n-level logic”, defined in terms
of two rules that are jointly probabilistically sound for all and only threshold levels r in the range (n − 1)/n < r 
n/(n + 1), for n 2.
Definition 6 (Q(n)). For specific integer n 2, a Q(n) consequence relation on L is any Q consequence relation that
satisfies the following two rules:
8{n}. if (B · (A1 · · ·An)) |∼¬(A1 · · ·An), B |∼A1, . . . ,B |∼An, then for all D, B |∼D (PL(n): Preface Logic n);
9{n + 1}. if (B · (A1 · A2)) |∼ ¬(A1 · A2), . . . , (B · (Ai · Aj)) |∼ ¬(Ai · Aj), . . . (B · (An · An+1)) |∼ ¬(An · An+1),
then B |∼ ¬A1 or . . . or B |∼ ¬An+1 (LL(n + 1): Lottery Logic n + 1).
Notice that PL(n) doesn’t presuppose that the Ai are distinct sentences. Thus, the rule PL(n) implies each of the rules
PL(m) for m n. Also notice that the P rule AND implies every PL(n) rule, for every value of n 2.
Rule PL(n) says that if a collection of sentences is small enough ( n) and B nonmonotonically implies each of
them, but B also implies-with-certainty that they cannot all hold, then B behaves like a “contradiction” in the sense
that it implies every sentence. However, it is perfectly compatible with this rule that a “non-contradictory” sentence B
may imply each of a large collection of jointly incompatible sentences, provided that collection consists of more than
n distinct sentences.
In the case where n = 2, for instance, PL(2) requires that if B |∼A and B |∼ ¬A, then (since B · (A · ¬A) |∼¬(A ·
¬A)) it follows that B |∼ D for every sentence D. More generally, rule PL(2) says that whenever B · (A1 · A2) |∼
¬(A1 · A2), we cannot have both B |∼ A1 and B |∼ A2 unless B behaves like a contradiction (i.e. unless B |∼ D for
all D). Furthermore, each rule PL(n) for n > 2 implies this PL(2) rule.
Think of PL(n) this way. Consider the situation of the preface paradox (first raised by Makinson in [8]). The author’s
careful editing of his book strongly supports his belief that page i is error free, for each page i, but his knowledge of
his own fallibility strongly implies that at least one error has slipped by in the editing process. Let each of the first n−1
sentences Ai be a sentence Fi that says that page i of the book is free from error, and let sentence An be the sentence
‘¬(F1 · · ·Fn−1)’, which says that not all n − 1 pages of the book are error free—that at least one page contains
an error. Notice that in this case the sentence (A1 · · ·An) is the sentence ‘(F1 · · ·Fn−1 · ¬(F1 · · ·Fn−1))’, which is an
outright logical contradiction. So, given the author’s knowledge B about the book, B · (F1 · · ·Fn−1 ·¬(F1 · · ·Fn−1)) |∼
¬(F1 · · ·Fn−1 · ¬(F1 · · ·Fn−1)) simply follows from REFLEX and RW. Thus, the rule says that when the number of
pages is n−1 (or fewer), B cannot consistently imply each of the n−1 claims that page i is error free and at the same
time imply the claim that at least one of the pages contains an error. That is, rule PL(n) says that when the number of
14 To see that NR follows from VCM, RM, and XM, suppose C |∼ A. (1) If C |∼ ¬B and C |∼ B , then by XM, C |∼ B · A, so C · B |∼ A by VCM.
(2) If C|/∼ ¬B , then C · B |∼ A by RM. (3) If C|/∼B , then C|/∼ ¬¬B , so C · ¬B |∼ A by RM.
15 Suppose r > 1/2, and suppose P [A | B] r and P [¬A | B] r . By CP rule 3, since P [A | B] + P [¬A | B] = 2r > 1, we have P [D | B] = 1
for all D.
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them is false, only if B itself is effectively a contradiction (in that B implies every claim, even it’s own negation).
The “preface interpretation” of the Ai described here is merely an illustration of the rule. The same rule holds
regardless of what the sentences Ai say. Notice too that this same rule, PL(n), also applies to a preface case for an n
page book (and not merely to an n − 1 page book, as in the above example) provided that B implies-with-certainty
that at least one page has an error—i.e. provided that B · (F1 · · ·Fn) |∼ ¬(F1 · · ·Fn).
It turns out that PL(n) is probabilistically sound for all and only the threshold levels r > (n − 1)/n, as the next
theorem shows.
Theorem 5 (Probabilistic soundness of rule PL(n) for all and only the threshold values r > (n − 1)/n). For n  2,
for each r > (n − 1)/n and each CP function P , the level-r consequence relation |∼ corresponding to P (defined as
‘B |∼A’ holds just in case P [A | B] r) satisfies PL(n). Furthermore, for each r  (n− 1)/n, there is a CP function
P such that the level-r consequence relation |∼ corresponding to P violates PL(n).
Proof. To see that whenever r > (n − 1)/n, PL(n) is satisfied by every probability function for threshold r : suppose
r > (n − 1)/n and P [¬(A1 · · ·An) | B · (A1 · · ·An)] r , but there is a D such that P [D | B] < 1. (We show that for
at least one of the Ai , P [Ai | B] < r .)
From the suppositions it follows that
0 = P [¬(A1 · · ·An) · (A1 · · ·An) | B
]
= P [¬(A1 · · ·An) | B · (A1 · · ·An)
] · P [(A1 · · ·An) | B
]
 r · P [(A1 · · ·An) | B
]
.
So P [(A1 · · ·An) | B] = 0. Then
1 = P [¬(A1 · · ·An) | B
] = P [¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬An | B
]
 P
[¬A1 | B
] + · · · + P [¬An | B
]
= (1 − P [A1 | B]
) + · · · + (1 − P [An | B]
) = n − (P [A1 | B] + · · · + P [An | B]
)
.
So P [A1 | B]+ · · ·+P [An | B] (n−1). Now, given this, if P [Ai | B] r > (n−1)/n for every Ai , then we would
have (n − 1) = n · ((n − 1)/n) < n · r  P [A1 | B] + · · · + P [An | B]  (n − 1), contradiction!!! Thus, for one of
the Ai , P [Ai | B] < r .
Conversely, to see that whenever r  (n − 1)/n, rule PL(n) is violated by at least one consequence relation that
corresponds to a conditional probability with threshold r , notice that there is clearly a probability function P with
the following characteristics: for a sentence B such that P [¬B | B] < 1 there are n sentences Ai such that B 
(¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨¬An), B ¬(¬Ai · ¬Aj), and each ¬Ai has the same probability given B . Then P [¬Ai | B] = 1/n for
each i. So P [Ai | B] = (n− 1)/n r for each i, yet there is a D such that P [D | B] < 1; and (since we also have that
B · (A1 · · ·An)  (¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬An)) we have r < 1 = P [(¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬An) | B · (A1 · · ·An)] = P [¬(A1 · · ·An) |
B · (A1 · · ·An)].
One additional observation is in order. Rule 6P is in effect the least upper bound of the PL(n) rules as n goes to
infinity. This makes good sense in terms of the probabilistic models of these rules. A PL(n) rule corresponds to lower
bound (n − 1)/n on the threshold in conditional-probabilistic models of consequence relations. As n increases, r is
driven ever closer to 1, which is precisely the probabilistic threshold appropriate to AND.
For each n 2, the LL(n+1) rule applies to any n+1 distinct sentences Ai that are implied-with-certainty by B to
be mutually exclusive. Notice that LL(n+ 1) implies each LL(m) rules for m n+ 1. So as n decreases the LL(n+ 1)
rules become stronger.
Think of LL(n + 1) this way. Consider a lottery (described by B) in which no two tickets can win. Let each of
the n + 1 sentences Ai say that ticket i will win, and suppose that B implies-with-certainty that no two ticket can
win—i.e. that this lottery can have at most one winner. The expressions of form ‘B · (Ai · Aj) |∼ ¬(Ai · Aj)’ express
this. Then, according to LL(n + 1), for any given block of n + 1 such tickets, B must nonmonotonically imply, for
at least one ticket i, the claim that ticket i will not win. (Indeed, if B treats all n + 1 tickets in the same way, then
it must imply that each will not win—though the requirement that all tickets are treated equally is not a part of rule
LL(n + 1) itself.) The idea behind LL(n + 1) is that if the number of tickets is too large (n + 1 or bigger), and if B
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B defeasibly implies that it won’t win.16
There is no assumption here that the lottery is fair—that all tickets have the same chance of winning. So the logic
only forces the issue for one of the n + 1 tickets. Also notice that if there are more than (n + 1) tickets, then for each
block of (n + 1) tickets, the rule applies. In other words, only for n or fewer tickets may B allow that each of them
“might win”—i.e. only for n or fewer tickets may the conditional ‘B |∼ ¬Ai ’ fail to hold for each of them.
The “lottery interpretation” of the Ai here is, of course, merely an illustration of the rule. The same rule holds for
all consequence relations in Q(n), regardless of how the Ai are interpreted.
It turns out that rule LL(n + 1) is probabilistically sound for all and only the threshold levels r  n/(n + 1), as the
next theorem shows.
Theorem 6 (Probabilistic soundness of rule LL(n +1) for all and only the threshold values r  n/(n+1)). For n 2,
for each r > 0 such that r  n/(n+1), and for each CP function P , the level-r consequence relation |∼ corresponding
to P (i.e. defined as ‘B |∼A’ holds just in case P [A | B] r) satisfies LL(n+1). Furthermore, for each r > n/(n+1),
there is a CP function P such that the level-r consequence relation |∼ corresponding to P violates LL(n + 1).
Proof. To see that whenever 0 < r  n/(n + 1), rule LL(n + 1) is satisfied by every probability function applied to
threshold r : suppose 0 < r  n/(n+ 1) and for each pair of the n+ 1 sentences Ai , P [¬(Ai ·Aj) | B · (Ai ·Aj)] r .
Notice that if for all D, P [D | B] = 1, then P [¬Ai | B] = 1 r for each Ai , and we’re done! So let’s also suppose
that for some D, P [D | B] < 1. (We want to show that for at least one Ai , P [¬Ai | B] r .)
From the suppositions it follows that for each distinct pair Ai and Aj ,
0 = P [¬(Ai · Aj) · (Ai · Aj) | B
] = P [¬(Ai · Aj) | B · (Ai · Aj)
] · P [(Ai · Aj) | B
]
 r · P [(Ai · Aj) | B
]
.
So P [(Ai · Aj) | B] = 0. Then we have
1 P [A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An+1 | B] = P [A1 | B] + · · · + P [An+1 | B].
Now, given this, if P [Ai | B] > 1/(n + 1) for every Ai , then we would have 1 P [A1 | B] + · · · + P [An+1 | B] >
(n + 1) · (1/n + 1) = 1, contradiction!!! Thus, for at least one of the Ai , P [Ai | B]  1/(n + 1), so P [¬Ai | B] 
n/(n + 1) r .
Conversely, to see that whenever r > n/(n+ 1) rule LL(n+ 1) is violated by at least one consequence relation that
corresponds to a conditional probability function with threshold r , notice that there is clearly a probability function P
with the following characteristics: for a sentence B such that P [¬B | B] < 1, there are n + 1 sentences Ai such that
B  (A1 ∨· · ·∨An+1), B  ¬(A1 ·Aj) for each pair, each Ai has the same probability given B . Then for r > n/(n+1)
we have P [Ai | B] = 1/(n + 1) for each Ai , so P [¬Ai | B] = n/(n + 1) < r for each Ai . But B · (A1 · Aj) 
¬(A1 · Aj), so P [¬(Ai · Aj) | B · (Ai · Aj)] = 1 r for each pair.
Rule LL(n + 1) is clearly compatible with rule PL(n), since the probability above r part of every conditional
probability function satisfies both rules whenever (n − 1)/n < r  n/(n + 1). Thus, Theorems 5 and 6 show that the
rules for Q(n) are probabilistically sound for precisely those thresholds r greater than (n − 1)/n but no greater than
n/(n + 1).
The logic of the Rational Consequence Relations, R, may reasonably be called Q(∞). For one thing, as n grows
ever larger, the bounds r such that (n− 1)/n < r  n/(n+ 1) for probabilistic models of the Q(n) logics approach 1.
For another thing, the rules PL(n) are implied by AND, and are superseded by it when r = 1. Furthermore, as n
increases, rules LL(n+ 1) approaches vacuity. At the same time, at r = 1 rule NR (Negation Rationality) becomes too
weak, and rule RM (Rational Monotony) supersedes it. Finally, at r = 1 the rules of R are probabilistically sound and
complete—i.e., the probability 1 part of each conditional probability function constitutes a consequence relation in R,
and each consequence relation in R is the probability 1 part of some conditional probability function.
16 Kyburg first raised the lottery paradox in [5], and treated it further in [6].
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We’ve seen that the rules for Q(n) are probabilistically sound for precisely those thresholds r above (n− 1)/n and
no greater than n/(n + 1). For any threshold level in this interval, the part of each conditional probability function
above that level constitutes a consequence relation in Q(n). And for each threshold level outside of this interval, there
is a conditional probability function whose part above that threshold constitutes a consequence relation not in Q(n).
However, the rules of Q(n) have not been shown to be probabilistically complete. Indeed, in a private communication
David Makinson has shown me that there are (linear ranked) consequence relations satisfying Q(n)’s rules that are
not probabilistically modelable at any threshold level. So although in the extreme case Q(∞), i.e. R, we do have
probabilistic completeness, additional rules are needed to restrict the class of Q(n) consequence relations for 2 n <
∞ to the probabilistically modelable ones. What are these additional rules like?
Those of you who are familiar with the logic of qualitative probability (a.k.a. comparative probability) know that
one way to get probabilistically modelable qualitative probabilities is to introduce a rule that says, in effect, that each
qualitative probability relation is extendable to a relation on language that includes sentences that form arbitrarily
fine partitions, where all sentences of a given partition are “approximately qualitatively equal”. It may then be shown
that these equal partition sentences can be used as a standard of comparison to fix numerical probabilistic weights
on all sentences of the language, and thereby generate a numerical probability function. A rather similar idea may be
applicable to the consequence relations in Q(n). I investigated one way to make this idea work in an earlier article
(see [2, Sections 4.2 and 4.3]). But the presuppositions of that approach seem overly strong. So, the issue of how
to plausibly supplement Q(n) in a way that completely characterizes probabilistic consequence relations remains an
open question.17
Appendix A
Theorem. Given any threshold r such that 0 < r < 1, for each rule OR, CM, AND and, there is a CP function P
(indeed, there is a classical Kolmogorov probability function) that violates the rule. However, for threshold r = 1 each
of these rules is probabilistically sound with respect to the CP functions.
Proof. Let r be any fixed real number such that 0 < r < 1. To show that a given rule fails for r we only need show
that there is a probability function P such that when we replace each expression of form ‘Z |∼ Y ’ in the rule by
‘P [Y | Z]  r’ the rule fails for P . (Notice that in each case below the probabilistic model P that violates the rule
can be one of the usual Kolmogorov probability functions; it need not be one of the “non-standard” functions in CP.)
Furthermore, we show that replacing each expression of form ‘Z |∼ Y ’ in the rule by ‘P [Y | Z] = 1’ yields a theorem
of CP-probability.
1. OR: We want to show that for each r such that 0 < r < 1, there is a function P and sentences C, B , and A such
that P [A | B] r and P [A | C] r but P [A | B ∨ C] < r . Clearly for any r such that 0 < r < 1, there is a P such
that for some C, B , and A, the following hold: P [B · C | C ∨ B] = P [¬B · C | C ∨ B] = P [B · ¬C | C ∨ B] = 1/3,
and P [A | B · C] = r + ε, while P [A | ¬B · C] = P [A | B · ¬C] = r − ε, for some ε > 0 but small enough that
0 < r − ε < r + ε < 1.
Now,
P [B | C] = P [B | C · (B ∨ C)] = P [B · C | B ∨ C]/P [C | B ∨ C]
= P [B · C | B ∨ C]/(P [B · C | B ∨ C] + P [¬B · C | B ∨ C]) = 1/2;
and so also P [¬B | C] = 1/2. So,
P [A | C] = P [A | B · C] · P [B | C] + P [A | ¬B · C] · P [¬B | C] = (1/2) · (r + ε + r − ε) = r.
Similarly, P [C | B] = 1/2 and P [¬C | B] = 1/2; so P [A | B] = r .
17 I am indebted to Greg Wheeler, two conference referees, and the participants at CMSRA-IV (Lisbon, September 22–23, 2005) for many valuable
comments and suggestions. Special thanks to David Makinson for a number of stimulating email communications about these logics.
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P [A | C ∨ B] = P [A | B · C] · P [B · C | C ∨ B] + P [A | B · ¬C] · P [B · ¬C | C ∨ B]
+ P [A | ¬B · C] · P [B · ¬C | C ∨ B] = (1/3) · (r + ε + r − ε + r − ε) = r − ε/3 < r.
For r = 1: suppose P [A | B] = P [A | C] = 1. Then (unless for all D, P [D | B ∨ C] = 1, and we’re done)
P [A | B ∨ C] = P [(A · B) ∨ (A · C) | B ∨ C] = P [A · B | B ∨ C] + P [A · C | B ∨ C]
= P [A | B] · P [B | B ∨ C] + P [A | C] · P [C | B ∨ C] = P [B | B ∨ C] + P [C | B ∨ C]
= P [B ∨ C | B ∨ C] = 1.
2. CM: We want to show that for each r such that 0 < r < 1, there is a function P and sentences C, B , and A such
that P [B | C] r and P [A | C] r but P [A | C · B] < r . We divide the proof into two cases, depending on whether
r  1/2 or r > 1/2.
Case 1: First, suppose that 0 < r  1/2. Clearly there is a P such that for some C, B , and A, the following hold:
P [A · B | C] = P [¬A · ¬B | C] = 0, P(¬A · B | C] = r , P(A · ¬B | C] = 1 − r  r . Then P [B | C] = P [¬A · B |
C] = r ; P [A | C] = P [A · ¬B | C] = 1 − r  r . However, P [A | C · B] = P [A · B | C]/P [B | C] = 0 < r .
Case 2: Alternatively, suppose that 1 > r > 1/2. There is a P such that for some C, B , and A, the following hold:
P [A ·B | C] · [(1 − r)/r2] = P [¬A ·B | C] = P [A · ¬B | C] > 0 and P [¬A · ¬B | C] = 0. We need to check that the
function P as just specified is not “over-constrained”. First,
1 = P [A ∨ ¬A | C] = P [A · B | C] + P [A · ¬B | C] + P [¬A · B | C] + P [¬A · ¬B | C]
= P [A · B | C] · (1 + 2 · [(1 − r)/r2]) = P [A · B | C] · [(r2 − 2r + 1) + 1]/r2
= P [A · B | C] · [(1 − r)2 + 1]/r2;
so our specification of P only requires that P [A ·B | C] = r2/[(1 − r)2 + 1], which for 1/2 < r  1 is clearly greater
than 0, and cannot be greater than 1 (else: r2 > (1− r)2 +1 = 2−2r + r2, so 2r > 2, which is impossible since r  1).
And since P [A ·B | C] = r2/[(1 − r)2 + 1], we have P [¬A ·B | C] = P [A · ¬B | C] = P [A ·B | C] · [(1 − r)/r2] =
(1 − r)/[(1 − r)2 + 1], which for 1 > r > 1/2 is clearly between 0 and 1.
Now we only need check that P [A | C] r and P [B | C] r , but P [A | C · B] < r .
P [A | C] = P [A · B | C] + P [A · ¬B | C] = r2/[(1 − r)2 + 1] + (1 − r)/[(1 − r)2 + 1]
= [(1 − r)2 + r]/[(1 − r)2 + 1],
which must be  r (else: r > [(1 − r)2 + r]/[(1 − r)2 + 1], so r · (1 − r)2 + r > (1 − r)2 + r , so r > 1).
Similarly, P [B | C] = P [A · B | C] + P [¬A · B | C] = [(1 − r)2 + r]/[(1 − r)2 + 1] r .
But,
P [A | C · B] = P [A · B | C]/P [B | C]
= (r2/[(1 − r)2 + 1])/([(1 − r)2 + r]/[(1 − r)2 + 1]) = r2/[(1 − r)2 + r],
which is must be < r (else: r  r2/[(1 − r)2 + r], so [(1 − r)2 + r] r , so (1 − r)2  0, which cannot be for r < 1).
For r = 1: suppose P [A | C] = P [B | C] = 1. Then either for all D, P [D | C] = 1, so 1 = P [A · B | C] = P [A |
B · C] · P [B | C] = P [A | C · B] or else 1 = P [A | C] = P [A · B | C] + P [A · ¬B | C] = P [A | B · C] · P [B |
C] + P [A | ¬B · C] · P [¬B | C] = P [A | C · B].
3. AND: We want to show that for each r such that 0 < r < 1, there is a function P and sentences C, B , and A
such that P [B | C] r and P [A | C] r but P [B · A | C] < r . Choose any such r . Clearly there exists a P such that
for some C, B , and A, P [B | C] = r and P [A | C] = r , and where B and A are independent for P given C, so that
P [B · A | C] = P [B | C] · P [A | C] = r2 < r .
For r = 1: suppose P [B | C] = 1 and P [A | C] = 1. Then either for all D, P [D | C] = 1, so P [A · B | C] = 1 or
else 1 = P [A | C] = P [A · B | C] + P [A · ¬B | C] = P [A · B | C] + P [A | ¬B · C] · P [¬B | C] = P [A · B | C].
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